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CONFLICT IN THE
COURTS: OBSCENITY
CONTROL & FIRST
AMENDMENT
FREEDOMS
FATHER EDWARD J. BERBYSSE, S.J.*
Regulation of obscenity has long taxed the mind of man in his effort
to enhance the welfare of the community while preserving freedom. The
advent of Christianity brought a higher moral standard. The teachings of
Christ and the reforms urged by St. Paul came into conflict with a world
long in moral decay. Today the West, which has tenuously held the Chris-
tian tradition, is widely secularized; and the Church has been hard-pressed
to hold the walls of society against moral collapse. To renew the Christian
message, she has appealed to the legal tradition which is interwoven with
Christian morality. While admitting the need for evolution in the law to
meet ever-changing conditions, she has urged a return to laws which reflect
the objective morality of the order in nature and do not conflict with
Eternal Law.
The United States derived its legal tradition from England's common
law. This heritage, built upon the Christian ethic and expressed in the
basic principle of procedural due process, is vibrant in English constitu-
tionalism and finds fundamental expression in the Constitution of the
United States. Whether one reads the Magna Charta and its historical
incorporation into the common law, or the history of American constitu-
tionalism, the issues of freedom and authority have a substratum of moral-
ity derived from Christian teaching. Contemporary society is confronted
with the necessity of maintaining a balance between protecting freedom
of expression and preventing the erosion of society's morality. The general
purpose of this writing is to analyze the common law tradition-both Eng-
lish and American-and to discover the basic principles which preserve
freedom and the moral health of society. More specifically, obscenity is the
particular concern of this paper. It will study the legal conflict between
those who advance the argument for greater individual permissiveness and
those determined to prevent the destruction of society's moral order.
* Associate Professor, Fordham University.
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COURT INTERPRETATION OF OBSCENITY IN ENGLAND
In early England, obscenity was little interfered with by the lay courts.
With the invention of printing in the 15th century, however, it soon became
apparent that some regulation was needed. Initially, control over publica-
tion was chiefly concerned with political and doctrinal rather than moral
issues. Even the Puritans, who disapproved of obscenity, were mainly con-
cerned with the stage and the Marprelate controversy. In Sir Edward
Coke's De Libellis Famosis (1606) there is no mention of obscene libel. The
matter was handled by ecclesiastical courts whose remedial powers were
limited to the imposition of such spiritual penalties as excommunication.
In 1727, obscenity was defined by the British Attorney General as an
"offense at common law" since "it tend[ed] to corrupt the morals of the
King's subjects and [was] against the peace of the King."' Even here, the
Attorney General qualified his denunciation of obscenity by stating: "I do
not insist that every immoral act is indictable . . . but if it is destructive
of morality in general, if it does or may affect all the King's subjects, then
it is an offence of a publick nature."2 Although the court adopted the
Attorney General's view, Mr. Justice Fortescue maintained that obscenity
was not indictable unless concomitant with "a breach of the peace or
something tending to it. . . . "3 Therefore, during the 18th century, ob-
scenity was an indictable offense only under appropriate circumstances.
During the 19th century in England, pornographic publications in-
creased and diversified "from highly priced erotica designed for biblio-
philes to the cheap trash intended for the general public."' To counter the
volume of pornography on the market, the Customs Consolidation Act
(1853) authorized the customs officers to confiscate "indecent or obscene
articles."5 Four years later Lord Campbell's Act gave judicial officers the
authority to require the "destruction" of pornographic publications which
they deemed equivalent to a " 'misdemeanor proper to be frosecuted as
such.' "6 These enactments were designed to protect society from publica-
tions which tended "to shock the common feelings of decency in a well
regulated mind."7
Late in the 19th century, the scope of the developing obscenity law
expanded its focus to the message conveyed by the publication rather than
the terminology used. In Regina v. Bradlaugh,5 the defendants, Charles
Rex v. Curl, 2 Stra. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727). On eighteenth century British law
regarding publications in general, see N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENrrY AND THE LAW 18-28
(1956) [hereinafter cited as ST. JOHN-STEVAS].
2 2 Stra. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
3Id.
' ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 39.
The Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c.107.
£ Lord Campbell's Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c.83 (1857). See ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 66-69.
146 PARL. DE3. (3d ser.) 327 (1857).
2 Q.B.D. 569 (1877), rev'd on other grounds, 3 Q.B.D. 607 (1878).
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Bradlaugh and Annie Besant, were prosecuted for publishing Charles
Knowlton's Fruits of Philosophy which urged the public to practice birth
control. The jury deliberated and ultimately reached an ambiguous ver-
dict: "We find that the book is calculated to corrupt public morals, but
we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motives in publish-
ing it."' The jury apparently based its verdict on the legal distinction
between intent and motive. Motive has been defined "as the desire
prompting an act, a state of mind which the law cannot take into ac-
count."' 0 Therefore, motive constitutes the underlying basis giving rise to
the formation of an intent. The question of motive is peculiarly within the
purview of the moralist. In contrast, the law, in order to establish criminal
liability, concentrates on the intent or purpose of the author or publisher.
Apparently as a consequence of this distinction, Chief Justice Cockburn
interpreted the jury's verdict to be consistent with guilt.
Earlier, in Regina v. Hicklin," Chief Justice Cockburn established the
standard for determining whether a publication is obscene: "The test of
obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter .. .[is] to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."'" The Chief Justice reesta-
blished the notion of public nature and emphasized the "tendency" as the
essence of the common law offense. Moreover, the intent to "deprave and
corrupt" could be equated with publications which evoke lewd thoughts,
stimulate licentious acts, or threaten the stability of society's moral order.
He acknowledged that the indiscriminate sale of an obscene pamphlet
could inflict evil on the public; but he remained conscious, as in
Bradlaugh, of the difficulty "in determining whether the publication is
calculated to corrupt public morals or is allowable in the discussion of a
public question." 3 Chief Justice Cockburn emphasized the urgency of pro-
viding special protection to young minds which were more vulnerable to
the contaminating tendencies of obscenity.
The court will allow the accused to present evidence of his good char-
acter provided it is pertinent to the alleged offense.' 4 Experts on matters
I Id.; see discussion in ST. JOHN-STEvAs at 70-74. St. John-Stevas distinguishes pornography
from obscenity: "A pornographic book, although obscene, is one deliberately designed to
stimulate sex feelings and to act as an aphrodisiac. An obscene book has no such immediate
and dominant purposes, although incidentally this may be its effect." It is to be noted that
the word pornography is of Greek origin, and means "the writing of harlots." In the Bradlaugh
case, the Chief Justice Cockburn of the Queen's Bench had his decision overruled by the High
Court which admitted a writ of error "on the grounds that the indictment was bad for setting
out only the title.and not the whole book." Id. at 73.
'0 ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 139.
L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 [1868].
." Id. at 371. Accord, R. v. Reiter, 2 Q.B. 16, 19 (1954); see ST. JOHN-STEVAs at 126-27.
ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 127.
Id. at 153.
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of science or art may give testimony. Furthermore, when the facts are
uncontested, it is the court's prerogative to draw the conclusions of law."0
Finally, the court must determine the intent of a bookseller or librarian in
making available an obscene book. Libel is not a crime of negligence, but
always requires a mental culpability (mens rea). It is presumed that book-
sellers can read only a fraction of the books which they sell. Therefore it is
often difficult to prove the criminal intent necessary to convict for selling
an obscene book.
In reviewing the problems that faced English legislation regulating
obscenity, St. John-Stevas observed that "[tihe obscenity problem in-
volves a conflict of rights, and thus no perfect solution is possible .... ""
The court must consider the circumstances of publication, the relevance
of sanctions against criminal libel under statutory and common law, and
the publication as an entity to determine its dominant effect. Moreover,
intent must be determined in order to draw the distinction between order-
ing the removal of pornographic publications from the market and an
unfettered control over all literary works. 7 Intent may be established by
direct or circumstantial evidence or inferred from the pubication itself. St.
John-Stevas contends that the weakness of English law on obscene libel
was its failure to demarcate the boundary beyond which a publication
would be criminal and the excessive discretionary authority residing in the
judges. St. John-Stevas concluded: first, a balance must be struck between
the right to freedom of expression and the necessity of protecting society
against rampant sexual misconduct; second, the "reasonable man" test
should be used in determining whether a publication is obscene, except
that a different standard should apply to children's books; and third, com-
mon law courts should be the forum for resolving obscenity issues."8
UNITED STATES CONTROLS OBSCENITY UNDER COMMON LAW INFLUENCE
While English courts were attempting to balance freedom of press
against the government's obligation to protect the public from pornogra-
phy, the United States also focused on the problem. In 1821, the court, in
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 9 held that the book Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure (Fanny Hill) was obscene and punishable under common law. By
1873, Congress had enacted legislation designed to eliminate the influx of
obscenity from abroad and prohibit use of the mail as a means of transport-
ing "obscene goods."20 Six years later, a district court adopted the test
'5 Id. at 154.
" Id. at 203.
I Id. at 137.
" Id. at 202-03.
17 Mass. 336 (1821).
o See ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 160. Analogous statutes currently in force are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-
63 (1970) (proscribing mailing and importation of obscene materials) and 19 U.S.C. § 1305
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developed in the aforementioned Hicklin case.' Nevertheless, Judge
Hand's observation indicates that some jurists were dissatisfied with the
Hicklin test.
[T]he rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with the mid-
Victorian morals, does not seem to me to answer to the understanding and
morality of the present time . . . . To put thought in leash to the average
conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities
of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy.2
Although the American courts were convinced that obscenity was not
protected under the first amendment, uncertainty existed as to whether a
particular publication was obscene. Consequently, to achieve some degree
of harmony, the courts considered the intent of the book as a primary
factor. For instance, the district court, in United States v. One Book Called
Ulysses,23 held that a book with a pornographic intent had to be removed
from the public; a contrary intent, however, required the court to analyze
the entire book before deeming it obscene. Judge Woolsey defined obscen-
ity as "tending to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and
lustful thoughts."24 This "stirring" was to be judged by its effect on "a
person with average sex instincts. . . . It is only with the normal person
that the law is concerned. 2 5 Judge Woolsey concluded that Ulysses was
not pornographic because he did "not detect anywhere the leer of the
sensualist."" A year later, the Second Circuit affirmed by noting that
[t]he book as a whole is not pornographic, and, while in not a few spots it
is coarse, blasphemous, and obscene, it does not, in our opinion, tend to
promote lust. The erotic passages are submerged in the book as a whole and
have little resultant effect.27
In effect, the opinion strengthened freedom of literary expression by toler-
ating obscenities interspersed throughout the publication. Judge Manton
dissented stating that "[n]o matter what may be said on the side of the
letters, the effect on the community can and must be the sole determining
factor . . . . [A] work must be condemned if it has a depraving influ-
ence." 2 As a consequence of Ulysses, four principles were developed to
facilitate the determination of obscenity: first, the author's intent, al-
though not determinative, must be considered; second, the publication's
(1970) (prohibiting importation of "immoral articles").
21 United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879).
" United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
23 United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
11 Id. at 184.
5 Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 183.
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934).
Id. at 711 (Manton, J., dissenting).
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"dominant effect," rather than infrequent obscenities, is the operative
test; third, the court must apply the "reasonable man" standard; and
finally, the publication's social value must be balanced against the preval-
ence of obscenities. 2
9
In the 1940's, parties charged with publishing or authoring obscene
works looked to the state and federal constitutions for vindication. In
Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 30 the publishing house maintained, in de-
fense of publishing Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County, that the
freedom of the press protections found in the New York Constitution and
the first amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, were being encroached. Since the
Supreme Court's vote was split, four-to-four, thereby upholding the con-
viction, no definitive rule can be derived from the case. In 1949, Judge Bok,
in Commonwealth v. Gordon,3' established a stringent test to be used in
determining whether a publisher could be convicted pursuant to an ob-
scenity statute. He ruled that a provision of the criminal code
may not constitutionally be applied to any writing unless it is sexually im-
pure and pornographic. It may then be applied as an exercise of the police
power, only where there is reasonable and demonstratable cause to believe
that a crime or misdemeanor has been committed or is about to be commit-
ted, as the perceptible result of the publication and distribution of the writ-
ing .... 32
The imminent danger of criminal behavior was the basis for the state
court's exertion of its police powers in confiscating these pornographic
writings. The Supreme Court moved slowly toward adopting rigorous re-
strictions on a state's police powers, and then only by certain justices
whose emphasis on individual liberty often rendered the public unpro-
tected against the sexual excesses of the libertarians.
The Supreme Court has held that freedom from prior restraints is not
an absolute right. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,3 Justice Murphy
stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. . . . Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
" ST. JOHN-STEvAS at 165.
- 335 U.S. 848 (1948). See ST. JOHN-STEVAS at 167-68.
11 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), aff'd sub nom., Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super.
120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950). See also ST. JOHN-STEvAS at 168-69.
32 66 Pa. D. & C. at 156.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.3
4
Although the defendant was convicted for using "fighting words," the
Court nevertheless made it clear that obscene speech was not protected by
the Constitution. Therefore, it can be inferred that so long as there is
protection of the "essential . . . exposition of ideas,"35 prior restraint
against obscene matter may be imposed. In Near v. Minnesota," Chief
Justice Hughes, in analyzing a statute which authorized an injunction
against a publisher of "an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, maga-
zine, or other periodical or a malicious, scandalous and defamatory news-
paper, magazine or other periodical,"37 held that as applied to an allegedly
defamatory article in a local newspaper the statute unconstitutionally in-
fringed upon freedom of the press. Nevertheless, he agreed by way of dic-
tum that "immunity from previous restraint is stated too broadly, if every
such restraint is deemed to be prohibited. . . . [T]he primary require-
ments of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.""8 In a
dissenting opinion which denied the presence of any previous restraint,
Justice Butler pointed to the indistinguishable nature of defamatory and
obscene publications, the latter having been held by the majority, in dic-
tum, as subject to injunction. 9
SUPREME COURT RESTRAINS STATE USE OF POLICE POWERS
In the late 1940's, the Supreme Court, having adopted the "clear and
present danger" test, had to define the legitimate use of the state's police
powers. A New York statute made it a misdemeanor if one "print[ed] .. .
publish[ed] . . . distribut[ed] . . . or possess[ed] with intent to sell
• . . any book . . . or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime."4 In
upholding the constitutionality of the enactment, the New York Court of
Appeals viewed the intent of the statute as prohibiting the "[c]ollections
of pictures or stories of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust . . . as to
become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the per-
son and in that case such publications are indecent or obscene .... *1 On
appeal, the Supreme Court, in Winters v. New York,"2 set the conviction
aside on the ground that, as construed, the statute failed to define the
prohibited acts in such a way as to exclude those which are a legitimate
Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
35 Id.
3- 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
31 Id. at 702.
3 Id. at 715-16.
Id. at 737 (Butler, J., dissenting).
, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141(2) (McKinney 1941) (repealed 1950).
People v. Winters, 294 N.Y. 545, 550, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1945).
2 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press. It failed,
moreover, to provide an ascertainable standard for the determination of
guilt. Less than two months later, the Court, in Musser v. Utah,'" vacated
a judgment of the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed convictions on a
charge of conspiring to "commit . . . acts injurious to the public health,
to public morals . . ."" by encouraging and engaging in polygamy. Al-
though the Court remanded the case to the state court for an interpretation
of the statute, the dissent went further and maintained that the conviction
should be reversed because, in construing the statute, "the line must be
drawn between advocacy and incitement, and even the state's power to
punish incitement may vary with the nature of the speech . . . . "I The
dissenting justices reached the zenith in the expression of the "clear and
present danger" doctrine. They would have narrowly interpreted the police
power limitation on free speech, looking carefully to "the degree of proba-
bility that the substantive evil actually will result.",4
In Butler v. Michigan,'7 the Court studied the question of standards
for determining police power regulation of traffic in obscene printed mat-
ter. It declared unconstitutional a Michigan statute prohibiting the distri-
bution to the general reading public of books containing obscene language
tending to corrupt the morals of youth. The Court reasoned that the
constitutional liberties of adults were arbitrarily curtailed by restrictions
applicable to children.
In the same year, the Court, in Alberts v. California,8 sustained a
state court conviction for obscenity on the grounds that obscenity, as dis-
tinguished from ideas having the slightest social importance, is not consti-
tutionally protected free speech. The Court said in part:
[Ilmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity
as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason
is mirrored in the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained,
reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity
laws of all of the 48 states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the
Congress from 1842 to 1956. . . .We hold that obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press.'9
The Court made clear the distinction between sex and obscenity, the latter
defined as "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to pru-
rient interest." 50 The California statute was deemed not to have violated
43 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-12-1 (1953).
, 333 U.S. at 101 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
I /d.
17 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
4 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
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the freedom of speech and press protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In a companion case, Roth v. United States,' a
federal obscenity statute was found not to violate the first amendment.
The statute read in part: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book,
pamphlet, picture . . .or other publication of an indecent character;
and-every written or printed card, letter, circular. . . giving information,
directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom . . . any of such men-
tioned matters .. .may be obtained . . .is declared to be nonmailable
matter."
5
To the constitutional question whether the two statutes (state and
federal) violated the "clear and present danger" test in that their
proscription was not limited to material that would probably induce the
recipients to antisocial conduct, the Court forthrightly stated that "ob-
scenity is not protected speech. 5 3 While rejecting the Hicklin test which
judged obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most suscepti-
ble persons, the Court set the standard for identification of obscene mate-
rial: "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals
to prurient interest," that is "having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts."54 The Court believed that this test provided "reasonably ascer-
tainable standards of guilt," and so was not in violation of the constitu-
tional requirements of due process. It also remarked that lack of precision
"is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process," since the Con-
stitution "does not require impossible standards." 5  Here the Supreme
Court wisely refused to be led down the road of mathematical calculations,
where free human actions were involved. While strongly protecting free
speech and press, it reiterated the constant constitutional rule that obscen-
ity, like libelous utterances, is not protected speech and left the determina-
tion of obscene material to mature judgment based on contemporary com-
munity standards.
In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan dissented from the Roth decision
and concurred in Alberts. In sustaining California's statute he reasoned:
The State can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time
the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of
which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral standards. And
the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of the home
against invasion of unsolicited obscenity."
Justice Harlan believed that under the Constitution, the protection of the
S, 354 U.S. 486 (1957).
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
5 354 U.S. at 485.
Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
354 U.S. at 491 (citation omitted).
354 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in Alberts).
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public from obscenity was "primarily entrusted to the care . . . of the
States." He feared "a deadening uniformity which can result from nation-
wide federal censorship"57 and rejected the contention that any book which
tends to stir sexual impulses is "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance." 8 He would leave the regulation of obscenity to the "police powers"
of the states, and so permit that difference of statute and conviction which
would arise from the diversity of state communities.
In another dissenting opinion Justice Douglas, with the concurrence
of Justice Black, expressed the idea that the first amendment's protection
of free speech was absolute.59 This is consistent with the belief that speech
enjoys a "preferred position" in the Constitution. Such dogmatic insist-
ence on unlimited free speech, apart from the "clear and present danger"
of violent or antisocial action, has not become a majority opinion of the
Court. Such a view leaves little room for reasonable restraint upon porno-
graphic elements that affront and corrosively attack the moral fabric of
society. It would leave the public open to abuse from grossly immoral
individuals and force the public to try to isolate itself from the broadcast
of filth by all the media of communication. It is needless to remark that if
such "freedom" were realized, neither adults nor children could escape the
bad effects; the peace and decency of the community would be destroyed.
The Roth-Alberts cases manifest the diverse reasonings of the Justices
and consequently are of problematical precedential value. They neverthe-
less incorporate the major principles of the Court's obscenity reasoning. In
post-Roth cases the attempts to determine what constitutes "obscenity"
have produced much confusion; but the narrowing of the category of ob-
scenity seems clear. In a 1957 case, Kingsley Books v. Brown, 0 Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, sustained a special procedure
under New York law by which the legal officer of a municipality could
invoke a limited injunctive remedy against the sale and distribution of
written and printed matter found after due trial to be obscene.6 To the
publisher's contention that the injunction was prior restraint, Justice
Frankfurter maintained that the civil procedure subjected him to no crimi-
nal prosecution without prior warning. He was subjected to no dread of the
law and was free to keep the book for sale and sell it, until a court order
specifically directed him to desist "for a prompt and carefully circum-
scribed determination of the issue of obscenity."6" The only criminal action
that he should fear would arise from contempt of the court order. The New
sl Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting in Roth).
sl Id. at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting in Roth).
s' Id. at 508-14 (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting).
'o 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
" N.Y. CODE OF CRIM. POC. § 22-a(2) (McKinney 1958). This section required a trial within
one day after joinder of issue and a decision within two days of the end of the trial.
62 354 U.S. at 442.
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York statute was not prior restraint in the strict sense of the word. Though
this seems a reasonable restraint upon obscene materials in conflict with
the public moral health, and the procedures in accord with due process,
nevertheless it was a thin victory: Justices Warren, Black, Douglas and
Brennan all dissented.
The confusion was further compounded in Kingsley International Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 3 wherein a New York motion picture licensing law
was vacated. The law banned films that were "obscene, indecent, immoral,
inhuman, sacrilegious, or . . . of such a character that . . . exhibition
would tend to corrupt morals or to incite to crime . . . ."" By amendment
the law became applicable to a film that "expressly or impliedly presents
. . . acts [of sexual immorality] as desirable, acceptable or proper pat-
terns of behavior. 6 5 In application to "Lady Chatterley's Lover," wherein
adultery was presented as "right and desirable for certain people under
certain circumstances,"" Justice Stewart made a distinction between
"sexual immorality" and "obscenity" or "pornography". They are, he said,
"entirely different." 7 The basis of this entire difference is far from clear.
Obscenity and pornography gradually corrode the moral fiber of society by
publicly striving to seduce the public conscience into acceptance of a de-
generate distortion of sexual integrity and by seriously tending to produce
action in conformity with idea. A novel that makes adultery desirable,
whatever the circumstances in which it may be fashioned, is also a corro-
sive of public morality. Moreover, it partakes of an additional evil in that
it seductively counsels a violation of the justice of the committed bond
between spouses.
It also comes into conflict with the legal code of the state which pro-
tects the accepted morality of a people. Justice Stewart's insistence is that
the first amendment's guarantee protects the freedom to advocate ideas.
That the first amendment ever intended to allow freedom to incite to
adultery, while prohibiting freedom for the expression of obscenity, por-
nography or polygamy, seems to be in clear contradiction to the Christian
ethic that formed the basis of our Constitution. The proposition that the
first amendment has come to allow such a distinction, through legislation
or court interpretation, is without proof. Though Justices Douglas and
Black concurred with the Stewart decision and consistently held their
thesis that all "censorship of movies is unconstitutional,"68 a majority of
the Justices cannot be said to have assented to the Stewart opinion. No
rule, therefore, was clearly established. Justice Frankfurter was in favor of
6" 360 U. S. 684 (1959).
N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 122 (McKinney 1969) (emphasis added).
" N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 122-a (McKinney 1969).
360 U.S. at 685.
'7 Id. at 688.
Id. at 690, 697 (concurring opinions).
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reversal because the statute did not apply to the particular film in issue. 9
Justice Harlan interpreted the New York statute as requiring "incitement"
and not "mere abstract expression of opinion" and believed that the film
lacked "anything that could properly be deemed obscene or corruptive of
the public morals by inciting to the commission of adultery."70 In this
opinion he was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker. It is interest-
ing to note that these Justices identified "inciting to the commission of
adultery," as obscenity, with a "corruption of public morals" against
which the state may legislate.7
In 1966 the Supreme Court handled three cases-two involving state
obscenity statutes, and one dealing with a federal obscenity statute. In
Ginzburg v. United States,7" the Court affirmed a conviction under federal
law. It viewed "the publications against a background of commercial ex-
ploitation of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal" and argued
that "[w]here the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determination
of obscenity."73 Justice Brennan considered that the "materials involved"
were "used as a subject of pandering"" and concluded that the Roth test
was applicable. It was noted that the advertising and selling of a work "on
the basis of its prurient appeal" is behavior "central to the objectives of
criminal obscenity laws"75 and therefore not within the protection of the
first amendment. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on the basis of
Id. at 695 (concurring opinion).
7' Id. at 705-06 (concurring opinion).
7, Id. at 708. In this case the Court quoted the opinion by Judge Conway of the New York
Court of Appeals, who said:
[I]t is curious indeed to say in one breath, as some do, that obscene motion pictures
which alluringly portray adultery as proper and desirable may not be censored. As
stated above 'The Law is concerned with effect, not merely with but one means of
producing it.'
360 U.S. 686 n.7, quoting, 4 N.Y.2d 349, 364, 151 N.E.2d 197, 205, 175 N.Y.S.2d 51, 55 (1958)
(emphasis added). It is my belief that Judge Conway is much more on the side of the true
interpretation of the first amendment meaning than is Justice Stewart. Justice Harlan be-
lieved that "the Court has moved too swiftly in striking down a statute which is the product
of a deliberate and conscientious effort on the part of New York to meet constitutional
objections." Id. at 702. Though Justice Harlan believed that the application of parts of the
film in question to the statute exceeded constitutional limits, he was convinced that it cannot
be claimed that adultery is not a form of "sexual immorality." Id. at 705. He agreed that "it
is the corruption of public morals, occasioned by the inciting effect of a particular portrayal
or by what New York has deemed the necessary effect of obscenity, at which the statute is
aimed." Id. at 706. Justice Harlan adds with telling effect: "It is difficult to understand why
the Court should strain to read those opinions as it has. Our usual course in constitutional
adjudication is precisely the opposite." Id. at 707.
72 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Id. at 466, 470.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 475 n.19.
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their interpretation of the first amendment."6 Justice Harlan dissented, in
the belief that such control of obscenity must be left to the "police powers"
of the state or a federal enactment under the postal or commerce powers.
He believed that the Court had written "a dubious gloss over a
straightforward 101-year-old statute" and that the first amendment in
matters of obscenity must be interpreted "in the light of the defendant's
conduct."77 Justice Stewart dissented because he found no federal statute
which made "commercial exploitation" or "pandering" or "titillation" a
criminal offense. He believed that the Court had no power to deny Ginz-
burg the protection of the first amendment because it disapproved of his
"sordid business. ' 78
In Mishkin v. New York, 7 the Court sustained a conviction under a
New York obscenity statute. The books involved depicted such deviations
as sadomasochism, fetishism and homosexuality. The Court found the
prurient-appeal standard easily satisfied: "[niot only was there proof of
the books' prurient appeal . . . but the proof was compelling; in addition
appellant's own evaluation of his material confirms such a finding." 8
Though Justices Black, Douglas and Stewart dissented, the majority opin-
ion was consistent with the Roth rule which held that obscenity (which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest) is without re-
deeming social importance and is not constitutionally protected speech.
PLURALITY OPINION OF MEMOIRS BRINGS CONFUSION IN LAW & PRECEDENT
The third case, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,"' which was decided in
1966, but before both Ginzburg and Mishkin, merely exacerbated the con-
fusion that characterizes this area of the law. Justice Brennan, whose
opinion was concurred in by Justices Warren and Fortas, expressed an
interpretation of the Roth rule which required the coalescence of three
elements: 1) a "dominant theme of material taken as a whole which ap-
peals to prurient interest in sex;" 2) material which is "patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards;" and 3) material
which is "utterly without redeeming social value. '8 2 Justice Brennan rea-
soned:
The Supreme Judicial Court (Mass.) erred in holding that a book need not
be unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene. A book cannot
be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value.
This is so even though the book is found to possess the requisite prurient
71 Id. at 476, 482 (dissenting opinions).
71 Id. at 494-95 (dissenting opinion).
71 Id. at 500 (dissenting opinion).
7, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
1* Id. at 510.
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
Id. at 418.
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appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of the three Federal constitutional
criteria is to be applied independently; the social value of the book can
neither be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient appeal or patent
offensiveness.
Justices Black and Stewart concurred in the decision of the Court but on
the basis of their reasoning in their dissents in Ginzburg and Mishkin."4
Justice Douglas found the Court's reasoning "disingenuous." 5 Dissenting
opinions were expressed by Justices Clark and White. The former asserted
that "social importance does not constitute a separate and distinct consti-
tutional test . . .So-called 'literary obscenity', i.e., the use of erotic fanta-
sies of the hard-core type clothed in an engaging literary style, has no
constitutional protection." 6 Justice White reasoned forcefully:
To say that material within the Roth definition of obscenity is neverthe-
less not obscene if it has some redeeming social value is to reject one of the
basic propositions of the Roth case-that such material is not protected
because it is inherently and utterly without social value.
.... [S]ocial importance -is not an independent test of obscenity but
is relevant only to, determining the predominant prurient interest of the
material, a determination which the court or the jury will make, based on
the material itself and all the evidence in the case, expert or otherwise."
Because only three Justices explicitly endorsed the "coalescence" in-
terpretation of the Roth rule, we may not conclude a change in the original
meaning of Roth was intended. Nevertheless, in some haste various legisla-
tures have changed their criminal code on obscenity to conform to the
Brennan reading of Roth, and have required for prosecution the coales-
cence of the "three elements". Clearly such revisions make prosecution for
obscenity almost impossible. Under such a test, the most obscene matter,
as long as it is clothed in literary or social garments, becomes constitution-
ally protected speech. Refinement of literary phrase or the agonizing of the
sociologist, though only given the slightest expression, can protect the most
pornographic of writings from indictment.
In Redrup v. New York,98 three cases, all involving state criminal and
civil proceedings against books and magazines, were decided simultane-
ously. The Court's majority concluded that all of the publications were
constitutionally protected "from governmental suppression, whether crim-
inal or civil, in personam or in rem."8 The Court further noted that in
these cases there was lacking any question of:
Id. at 419.
" Id. at 421.
" Id. at 426.
Id. at 445, 450.
Id. at 461-62.
" 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
Id. at 770.
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1) "a specific and limited state concern for juveniles";
2) "an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so obtru-
sive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure
to it";
3) "evidence of... 'pandering.' "10
Reflecting on this reasoning of the Court, it can be argued that the "coa-
lescence" requirement of the three Justices in the Memoirs case would not
be applicable to legislation involving juveniles, an inescapable assault
upon individual privacy, or pandering. Such materials cannot be regarded
as constitutionally protected publication, whether or not they contain
"redeeming social value." In apparent emphasis on the point of special
state legislation for the protection of juveniles, in Ginsberg v. New York,"
the Court upheld section 484-h of the New York Penal Law which prohibits
the sale to minors under seventeen years of age of material defined to be
obscene. The Supreme Court sustained the New York trial court's convic-
tion of Ginsberg for the sale of materials depicting female "nudity." The
trial court had convicted under the law that prohibited material which:
1) "predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of
minors"; and
2) "is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors"; and
3) "is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors."'"
The lower court, in sustaining the state statute, held the first two condi-
tions sufficient for conviction, apart from the matter of "social import-
ance."93 Upon review the Supreme Court cited Roth in a restatement of the
proposition that "obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or
press.' ' 94 Though the case primarily brought out the Court's belief that a
minor's judgment in selecting sex material is more restricted than that of
an adult, it also reiterated the constitutionally unprotected character of
obscenity. With his usual individuality of approach, Justice Harlan in a
concurring opinion repeated his conviction that "this whole problem is
primarily one of State concern, and that the Constitution tolerates much
wider authority and discretion in the States to control the dissemination
of obscene materials than it does in the Federal Government." 5 Moreover,
in reflecting on the diversity of opinion of the Justices, he remarked, "Any-
one who undertakes to examine the Court's decisions since Roth which
have held particular material obscene or not obscene would find himself
in utter bewilderment."' 6
" Id. at 769.
" 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
92 Id. at 633, quoting, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(1)(f) (McKinney 1967).
13 People v. Ginsberg, 56 Misc. 2d 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
390 U.S. at 635.
Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968).
Id. at 707.
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The great error was committed by three Justices who enunciated the
"coalescence" requirement in Memoirs and by lower courts and legislators
who have incorporated this requirement into their decisions and legisla-
tion. A return to the verbal clarity of meaning of Roth was needed. Instead,
we were subjected to a new confusion, expressed in Stanley v. Georgia . 7
In that case, though Justice Marshall made clear that Roth was not con-
cerned with the private possession of obscene matter, and so "cannot fore-
close an examination of the constitutional implications of a statute forbid-
ding [it],""9 yet he spoke with some hesitation. "Roth," he said, "does
declare, seemingly without qualification, that obscenity is not protected by
the first amendment." 9 While Justice Marshall found, realistically
enough, no grounds in the Constitution for "controlling a person's private
thoughts," he went too far in contending that "there appears to be little
empirical basis for . . . [the assertion] that exposure to obscenity may
lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence."1 0 Secondly,
his citing of Justice Brandeis, 0 1 in Whitney v. California,02 wherein it was
stated that "the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are
education, and punishment for violations of the law,"'0 3 is not applicable.
Obscenity, under the Constitution, is not protected speech, and thus the
"clear and present danger" is not pertinent here, as it was in the Whitney
case. Finally, Justices Stewart, Brennan and White, while concurring in
the decision, understandably expressed their belief that the case should
have been solved on the basis of the fourth and fourteenth amendments,
and that the Court should not have disregarded "this preliminary issue in
its hurry to move on to newer constitutional frontiers."'0 4
While confusion in the courts and legislatures was coalescing and
while public criticism grew, the Supreme Court determined that a federal
statute'05 prohibiting the knowing use of the mails for the delivery of ob-
scene matter was unconstitutional. It was the opinion of Justice White, in
United States v. Reidel,'01 that "Reidel was wrong in assuming that he had
a 'first amendment right to do business in obscenity and use the mails in
the process.' "7 He asserted that the Roth case had not been over-
ruled-that "it remains the law in this Court and governs this case."' ' He
added that Stanley v. Georgia did not impair the validity of Roth
97 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
11 Id. at 564.
" Id. at 560.
"" Id. at 566.
Id. at 566-67.
102 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
1*1 Id. at 378.
"1 394 U.S. at 569 (concurring opinion).
,01 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
IN 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
07 Id. at 356.
"' Id. at 354.
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insofar as the distribution of obscene material was concerned. . .Whatever
the scope of the 'right to receive' referred to in Stanley, it is not so broad as
to immunize the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here-
dealings that Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment. 9
Although Justice White consistently stands firm on the proposition that
the first amendment gives no shelter to obscenity, he introduces a disquiet-
ing note in his "postscript." He notes a "developing sentiment that adults
should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess and consume
whatever communicative materials may appeal to them""' and that the
law's involvement be limited to the protection of children. He believes that
"reassessment" of the law "may prove to be the desirable and eventual
legislative course.""' Justice White's position seems to assert that the
legislature may, without hindrance from Roth, "restructure the obscenity
laws,"" 2 even to the extent of allowing commerce in obscenity. Such judi-
cial restraint might have the effect of opening the Constitutional doors to
a wide commerce in obscenity by legislative permissiveness-under pres-
sure of such concerned groups as the ACLU, the motion picture industry
and the book publishers. To permit such legislative action would be to
amend the Constitution, making obscene expression allowable under the
first amendment. Is Justice White correct in asserting that the first amend-
ment "neither proscribes dealings in obscenity nor directs or suggests legis-
lative oversight in this area?""'
Whatever may be the historico-juridical resolution of this query, it is
my impression that the majority of the American people prefer the restric-
tion of obscenity.
In a companion case to Reidel, United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs,"' the Court upheld the federal law prohibiting importation
of obscene material and providing for its seizure by customs officials." 5 The
plurality opinion of Justice White (joined by Justices Burger, Brennan and
Blackmun) found an essential distinction between the private possession
of obscenity in one's home and the importation of obscene materials from
abroad "whether for private use or public distribution.""' The private
user, as in Stanley, may not be prosecuted; but this "does not mean that
he is entitled to import it from abroad free from the power of Congress to
exclude noxious articles from commerce."" 7 Again Justice White appealed
o Id. at 354-55.
"o Id. at 357.
Id.
112 Id.
", Id. at 356.
402 U.S. 363 (1971).
1 Tariff Act of 1930 § 305, ch. 497, § 305, 46 Stat. 688 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) (1970).
"' 402 U. S. at 376.
Id.
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to Roth and cited Reidel in his assertion that "obscenity is not within the
scope of First Amendment protection. Hence Congress may declare it con-
traband and prohibit its importation.""' In the Thirty-seven Photographs
case, Justice Harlan concurred in the decision, but on the ground that the
petitioner "lacked standing to raise the overbreadth claim."" 9 Justice
Stewart also concurred in the judgment, but denied that "the Government
may lawfully seize literary material intended for the purely private use of
the importer."'' 0 Justices Black and Douglas dissented, by denying any
first amendment right for Congress to act as censor.' Justice Marshall
believed that obscene materials distributed through the mails allowed reg-
ulatory action for the protection of children and unwilling adults. Conse-
quently, he concurred in Reidel but dissented in Thirty-seven Photographs
on the ground that "the seized items were then in his purely private posses-
sion and threatened neither children nor anyone else.""' He believed that
"the Government has ample opportunity to protect its valid interests if
and when commercial distribution should take place."' 2
THE COURT REITERATES AND CLARIFIES ROTH
In the spring session of 1973, the Supreme Court handed down a series
of decisions on obscenity, most of which dealt with state statutes. In Miller
v. California,'4 the Court upheld the ruling of the Superior Court of Cali-
"' Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 378 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 379 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 379 (dissenting opinion).
402 U.S. at 360 (concurring opinion).
,, Id. at 361. It is interesting to note that Justice Marshall was most willing to restrict
distribution through the mails of obscene materials, as decided in Reidel, but would not
assent to the Government's right to remove obscene materials from the baggage of the appel-
lee at the customs office. In Reidel, he feared that obscenity would be sent to children, even
though the appellee "indicated his intent to sell to only adults who requested his wares." Id.
Justice Marshall could have envisioned, with a customs house open to obscenity, a flood of
foreign obscenity that would ultimately become a threat to the morality of children. He is
convinced that "the Government has ample opportunity to protect its valid interests if and
when commercial distribution should take place." Id.
I submit that it would be much more effective for the Federal government to "protect
its valid interests" at the port of entry of the sordid stuff. Our Constitution has always
protected the national government's right to protect the public from the importation of plant
diseases and human (physical) diseases; it would be a great inconsistency to open the door
to moral evils if we still accept the Government's role of protecting both the bodily and moral
health of its people. If Justice Marshall really believes in the Roth rule that obscenity has no
protection under the first amendment, then it is difficult to understand why he would permit
the public authority to cooperate in the public act of bringing obscene material into the
country, with a high possibility that it will have a significant impact upon the public. Is the
prurient interest or the financial success of such an importer of greater weight than the public
health?
124 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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fornia that the trial court had constitutionally convicted Marvin Miller of
a misdemeanor in mailing unsolicited advertising brochures containing
pictures and drawings explicitly depicting sexual activities. Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for the majority, reiterated the Roth rule that "implicit
in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance," and repeated the Court's
judgment enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire'25 that obscene
utterances "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas."'' 6 The Court
also put to rest the so-called "test" of Memoirs v. Massachusetts' in
which a plurality opinion demanded, as an independent criterion, that
matter must be "utterly without redeeming social value." The Chief Jus-
tice found this "test" to be "a burden virtually impossible to discharge
under our criminal standards of proof;""' he rejected it as inconsistent
with Roth, and not held by any member of the Court today.
The Court then said that "[s]tate statutes designed to regulate ob-
scene materials must be carefully limited."'2 9 While emphasizing that it
was not the Court's function "to propose regulatory schemes for the
States,"'30 it set basic guidelines:
1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient inter-
est.
2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value."'
The Court further attempted to give a "few plain examples of what a
state statute could define for regulation.'13 It also accepted the place for
the jury system in determining questions of fact, while safeguarding the
law by judges, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence and other ele-
ments in due process. In addressing itself to the minority opinion of Justice
Brennan who feared "institutional tension," the Chief Justice reasoned
that there would be no remedy of tension between state and federal courts
"by arbitrarily depriving the States of a power reserved to them under the
Constitution."133 Here the Court made clear that, though "fundamental
5 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26 Id. at 572.
' 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
121 413 U.S. at 22.
2" Id. at 23-24.
230 Id. at 25.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 25.
'1 Id. at 29. In the majority opinion, the Court specifically notes that Mr. Justice Brennan
"has abandoned his former positions and now maintains that no formulation of this Court,
the Congress, or the States can adequately distinguish obscene material unprotected by the
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First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from
community to community,"' 34 questions of fact cannot be determined by
uniform national standards. With such diversity characterizing the coun-
try, the state community may devise its own norms. By way of parallel the
Court argued:
The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in
criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers-of-fact to draw on the
standards of their community, guided always by limiting instructions on the
law.
35
The Chief Justice noted that during the trial, "both the prosecution and
the defense assumed that the relevant 'community standards' in making
the factual determination of obscenity were those of the State of Califor-
nia, not some hypothetical standard of the entire United States of Amer-
ica.I' 36 The appellant, said Mr. Chief Justice Burger, raised for the first
time, in an appeal to the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of
California, the objection that application of state, rather than national,
standards violated the first and fourteenth amendments. In noting this
objection Chief Justice Burger cited former Chief Justice Warren's state-
ment in Jacobellis v. Ohio:'3 7
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined
by reference to "community standards," it meant community stan-
dards-not a national standard. . . . I believe that there is no provable
'national standard' . . .. 8
Finally, he vigorously asserted, "People in different States vary in their
tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the abso-
lutism of imposed uniformity.' '3 0 The Court concluded by reaffirming Roth
First Amendment from protected expression." Id. at 27. The majority criticizes this position,
saying: "Paradoxically, Mr. Justice Brennan indicates that suppression of unprotected ob-
scene material is permissible to avoid exposure to unconsenting adults ... and to juveniles,
although he gives no indication of how the division between protected and nonprotected
materials may be drawn with greater precision for these purposes than for regulation of
commercial exposure to consenting adults only." Id. at 27. The majority further adds that
"if the inability to define regulated materials with ultimate, god-like precision altogether
removes the power of the States or the Congress to regulate, then 'hardcore' pornography may
be exposed without limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike, as,
indeed, Mr. Justice Douglas contends." Id. at 27-28. Finally the majority, in response to Mr.
Justice Brennan's plea of "institutional stress," states: "Nor should we remedy 'tension
between state and federal courts' by arbitrarily depriving the States of a power reserved to
them under the Constitution." Id. at 29.
" 413 U.S. at 30.
13 Id.
Id. at 31.
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
' 413 U.S. at 33.
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in its ruling that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment by
asserting that obscene matter can be regulated by the states, subject to
specific safeguards and by application of contemporary community stan-
dards. 40
Another aspect of the regulation of obscenity by the states was raised
in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,4 ' wherein the operators of "adult"
theatres raised a plea of certiorari to the Supreme Court from a decision
of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The state's supreme court found that the
films, exhibiting "scenes of simulated fellatio, cunnilingus, and group sex
intercourse,"'' were not protected by the first amendment; and that exhi-
bition of obscene material in public places is not protected by any constitu-
tional doctrine of privacy. Chief Justice Burger noted that Georgia's action
of employing a civil injunction against the exhibition of obscene materials
was constitutional-that it was not error to fail to require "expert" affirm-
ative evidence that the materials were obscene "when the materials them-
selves were actually placed in evidence.' '4 3 The Chief Justice then reached
the heart of the matter when he said:
We categorically disapprove the theory, apparently adopted by the trial
judge, that obscene pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from
state regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting adults
only.' 4
The Court noted that, whereas the ruling of Stanley v. Georgia'4 allowed
"the right of Stanley to possess, in the privacy of his home, pornographic
films," 1 the present case had a decidedly public character:
We have declined to equate the privacy of the home relied on in Stanley with
a "zone" of "privacy" that follows a distributor or a consumer of obscene
materials wherever he goes. 7
The Court then considered the question whether there is at least an
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime, and here cited
the Hill-Link Minority Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Por-
nography. Besides, there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to
maintain a decent society ".... I4 The Court also rejected the contention
that, in the absence of conclusive scientific data demonstrating that expo-
sure to obscene materials adversely affects men and women, there should
be no state regulation. "It is not for us," said the Court, "to resolve empiri-
"' Id. at 33-34.
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
,,2 Id. at 52.
I3 d. at 56.
" Id. at 57.
"5 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
413 U.S. at 53.
I7 d. at 66.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964).
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cal uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional case
where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by the
Constitution itself."" 9 In support of this the Court quoted extensively from
its decisions, especially in review of state and national regulation of com-
merce and business, which had been based on assumptions that might be
unprovable. The Court criticized those who, holding an absolutist view of
the first amendment, allowed for a severe restraint in the marketplace of
goods and money, but not in the marketplace of pornography. And so:
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial
behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reason-
ably determine that such a connection does or might exist. In deciding Roth,
this Court implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on
such a conclusion to protect "the social interest in order and morality. "11
Turning to the question of an assumption that people have the capacity
for free choice, the Court admitted that most exercises of individual free
choice are explicitly protected by the Constitution but that "totally unlim-
ited play for free will . . . is not allowed in ours or any other society."' 5 '
Finally, the Court admitted the state's rights argument that, in the
exertion of its police powers, it might adopt a laissez-faire policy and "drop
all controls on commercialized obscenity";'52 that the Supreme Court does
"not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need and propriety
of laws that touch economic problems business affairs or social condi-
tions." 5 The Court was decidedly convinced, as in Miller, that such regu-
lation by the states is within their scope of powers reserved under the
Constitution, and only reviewable when the true freedoms of the first
amendment are involved. Chief Justice Burger rejected the claim that the
State of Georgia was attempting to control the minds or thoughts of those
who patronize theatres. To prevent the display of obscene material "is
distinct from a control of reason and the intellect."'' The state has the
right "to maintain a decent society . . . .
Another case was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari from the
Superior Court of California. In Kaplan v. California,"56 Kaplan, the pro-
prietor of the Peek-A-Boo Bookstore, was charged with selling to a police
officer a book "made up entirely of repetitive descriptions of physical,
sexual conduct, 'clinically' explicit and offensive to the point of being
413 U.S. at 60.
" Id. at 60-61, citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 485, quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added in Roth).
413 U.S. at 64.
152 Id.
Id., quoting, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
"' 413 U.S. at 67.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964).
"' 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
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nauseous."' 57 The book was received in evidence as read, in its entirety, to
the jury in the trial hearing. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal
to the Surperior Court of California. The petitioner's contention that "all
books were constitutionally protected in an absolute sense"'' 8 was rejected
by the California Court. The Supreme Court agreed. It observed that ob-
scenity, whether in conduct, or in written and oral descritpion, or in photo-
graphs and moving pictures, is not protected by the first amendment. The
Court, in noting the continuing life of a book, remarked that "widely
circulated books of this category" have a tendency "to reach the impres-
sionable young and have a continuing impact."'59 The Court stated that
states need not wait until behavioral experts provide empirical data before
enacting controls of commerce in obscene materials. Here it adverted to
the reasoning in Paris Adult Theatre I, repeating that it was not arguable
that "sale of sexually oriented material to consenting adults is constitu-
tionally protected";' and insisting that "the prosecution's evidence was
sufficient, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to support petitioner's
conviction;"'' and that the book, "taken as a whole, predominantly ap-
pealed to the prurient interest of the average person in the State of Califor-
nia, applying contemporary standards."'62
On the same date the above decisions were handed down, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,6 3
which tested the constitutionality of a section of the United States Code.",
The statute provided in part:
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country. . . any obscene book, pamphlet, paper. . . print, picture,
drawing . . . or other article which is obscene or immoral.6 5
The claimant Paladini sought to carry movie films, etc., into the United
States from Mexico. The materials were seized as being obscene by cus-
toms officers at Los Angeles Airport. The narrow issue in this case was
whether the United States may constitutionally prohibit importation of
obscene material which "the importer claims is for private, personal use
and possession only."' 66 Claimant was denied any first amendment protec-
tion, first because Roth allows no such protection, and secondly because
Stanley gives a precise and narrow protection to privacy, based on the
151 Id. at 116-17.
1, Id. at 118.
"I' Id. at 120.
160 Id.
"' Id. at 122.
62 Id. at 121.
163 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
"1 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
165 Id.
"1 413 U.S. at 125.
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law's "'solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within [the
home].'"'67 As Justice White said in United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs,'68 "Stanley's emphasis was on the freedom of thought and
mind in the privacy of the home. But a port of entry is not a traveler's
home.""1 9 The Court also noted that "it is extremely difficult to control the
uses to which obscene material is put once it enters this country. ' ' 7
Chief Justice Berger again delivered the majority opinion of the Court
in Heller v. New York, 7' which found the defendant guilty of violating the
state obscenity laws. On request of a state law enforcement official, a New
York State Criminal Court judge viewed a motion picture, found it ob-
scene, and issued warrants under which the manager of the theatre was
arrested and the film seized. In a non-jury trial the New York Criminal
Court rejected the defendant's contention that the seizure of the film with-
out a prior adversary hearing violated his constitutional rights. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals the conviction was affirmed. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court held that the seizure was constitutionally
permissible if such seizure was pursuant to a warrant issued after a deter-
mination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and if following the
seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue was avail-
able at the request of any interested party, with copying of the seized film
being permitted if necessary for continued exhibition of the film pending
judicial determination of the obscenity issue. 7 1 In the Court's ruling Chief
Justice Burger said:
This Court has never held, or even implied, that there is an absolute First or
Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior adversary hearing applicable to all
cases where allegedly obscene material is seized. . . . In particular, there is
no such absolute right where allegedly obscene material is seized, pursuant
to a warrant, to preserve the material as evidence in a criminal prosecution . 17
It is "an open question whether a judge need 'have viewed the motion
picture before issuing the warrant.' ",,7 It was determined that it was not
required that an adversary proceeding must take place prior to initial
seizure. 7 5 It was held, rather, that a judicial determination must occur
"promptly so that administrative delay does not in itself become a form
of censorship. 17 1 In the Heller case there was no final restraint in the sense
17 Id. at 127, quoting, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
I6 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
' Id. at 376.
,7" 413 U.S. at 129.
.7 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
'7 Id. at 484-94.
'7' Id. at 488.
'7, Id., quoting, Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968).
17 413 U.S. at 489.
171 Id., quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971).
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of being enjoined from exhibition or threatened with destruction. The
Court noted that in this case "the barrier to a prompt judicial determina-
tion of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding was not the State,
but petitioner's decision to waive pretrial motions and reserve the obscen-
ity issue for trial."'77 It remarked that the seizure of a copy of the film did
not prevent the continuing exhibition of the film and took judicial notice
of the statement of the counsel for New York that movie films tend to
"disappear" if adversary hearings are afforded prior to seizure.
Another case, Roaden v. Kentucky,'18 served as a check on over-
zealous police officers who, without warrant, seized an obscene film exhib-
ited at a drive-in theatre. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts of Kentucky, arguing that the seizure, without the authority
of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, was a prior restraint on expression
and an unreasonable action under the fourth amendment, and that the
admission in evidence of an unconstitutionally seized film required rever-
sal of conviction. In this case the petitioner did not contest the obscenity
of the film at trial. The law enforcement agency did not contest the asser-
tion that: first, the sheriff had no warrant when he made the arrest and
seizure; second, there had been no prior determination by a judicial officer
on the question of obscenity; and third, the arrest was based solely on the
sheriffs observing the exhibition of the film. The Supreme Court quoted
the fourth amendment's proscription against "unreasonable seizures," and
noted that "seizure of instruments of a crime, such as a pistol or a knife,
or 'contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves' . are
to be distinguished from quantities of books and movie films .... "',7 In
this case, the Court said:
The seizure is unreasonable, not simply because it would have been easy to
secure a warrant, but rather because prior restraint of the right of expression,
whether by books or films, calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of
reasonableness. 180
The Court remarked that since "there are exigent circumstances in which
police action literally must be 'now or never' to preserve the evidence of
the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evalua-
tion."'"' In the matter of seizure of books or films, however, there are
presented "no such 'now or never' circumstances." The effect of this case
is to show that the Court will not tolerate what the ACLU would label
"witch-hunting" or censorship. It insists upon constitutionally correct pro-
cedures in preventing obscenity.
"1 413 U.S. at 490-91.
413 U.S. 496.
'7' Id. at 502, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 (1971).
" 413 U.S. at 504.
'~' Id. at 505.
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On October 23, 1973, the Court handed down 11 obscenity decisions
which reiterated local standards as the measure of obscenity, as long as the
standards are held within the restraining limits of the new "guidelines"
enunciated by the Court in its decisions of June 21, 1973. The majority did
not file opinions in any of the cases. The minority of the Justices, under
the leadership of Justice Douglas, found the producers and sellers "at the
mercy of the local police force's conception of what appeals to 'prurient
interest' or is 'patently offensive.' 1,2 It seems not to have occurred to the
minority that the people wish their government, through its legally consti-
tuted officers, to remove from public display obscenity which is not pro-
tected by the first amendment. The people are not opposed to an exchange
of ideas. They reject a degenerate flooding of pornography into the public
marketplace, just as they refuse a place for worthless securities and com-
municative diseases. They find that their elective government is better
qualified to protect the common good than those who opt for flooding the
market with profit-bearing obscenity at a cost to public morality, and more
conscientious of the commonweal than those who imagine that the rights
of the first and fourteenth amendments are absolute, and checked by no
other purposes of government.
AUTHOR'S CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The Court, consistent with a long tradition, holds that the freedoms
of the first amendment are basic and may not be restrained. Yet such
freedoms are not absolutes. Speech, press, literature, movies and conduct
which explicitly and significantly are obscene are subject to the "police
powers" of government. The Court is well aware that civil society is not in
existence merely for the protection of individual expression, but also in
order to maintain the public order. Preservation of moral decency is essen-
tial to the latter. The state must legislate both for the individual freedom
and for the healthy order of society. The Supreme Court will be called on
to review the legislative act and judicial reasoning of lower courts, both
national and local. In so doing it will strive both to restrain the govern-
ment's unreasonable use of the "police powers" and a permissive licensing
of an individual's abuse of speech, writing and action.
In holding that obscenity is not protected free speech, the Court is
consistent with the tradition of the English common law. This heritage
incorporates a moral tradition which is based on Christian revelation and
a philosophical ethic that is concretized in positive law.
Once a law has been enacted by a state or by the Congress, it is
challenged for constitutionality by those affected. The Court asks: Is the
law violative of the basic freedoms of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments? Does it harbor a potential repression of legitimate freedom? A
182 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1973, at 8, col. 4.
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statute, therefore, must have a high degree of clarity, even though - since
it deals with free human acts - it cannot be drawn with the precision
found in mathematics. While the Court must be a concerned custodian of
the individual's freedom, it also must practice restraint in overturning law.
The legislature is the body most immediately representative of the people
who are the sovereign source of government. The Court looks to the law,
constitutional and statutory, for light, and only with reluctance does it
overturn the legislative statute. As a judicial tribunal it should not prefer
the freedom of an individual to the law which is enacted for the protection
of, and presumably with the consent of the people who are individuals
constituting the commonwealth. It is neither legal nor prudential for the
Court to hold a doctrinaire thesis in the face of the people's determination
to retain its moral tradition in matters so oppressive of the common good
as obscenity. To do so is to force the people to such emergency and difficult
measures as constitutional amendment. Reasonable law-making should be
presumed to represent the reasoned will of the people, and so should not
lightly be overturned.
Admitting that restraint must be observed both in legislative enact-
ment and judicial decision, the law must also evaluate the nature of ob-
scenity. Legislation, both state and national, has consistently held that
obscenity is that which appeals to prurient interest. Whether it is highly
"literary" erotica or cheap trash, it has no human value. Rather it has the
effect of shocking the feelings of decency in a balanced mind, and a tend-
ency to disgust adults while corrupting the morals of youth. The matter of
obscenity is not determined by observing its effect upon a person's moral
activity. It is not protected from indictment by a need of proof that it will
cause a "clear and present danger" of immoral action. It is enough that it
manifest a tendency to corrupt public morality. The law cannot be defused
from action by the sociologist's statistics on whether or not obscenity leads
to immoral action. The law must protect society from being publicly and
shamelessly affronted by matter that is degenerate. Because of its degener-
acy such matter cannot be said to have literary or social value. The United
States Supreme Court has frequently used the "clear and present danger"
test in respect to inciting speech which is allowable in times of peace, but
which is limited in times of national emergency. Obscenity is different,
since it is never legitimate speech under the Constitution.
The law looks to the intention that becomes apparent in the matter
that is written or filmed. To the reasonable man it soon becomes evident
that certain matter does not reflect sociological concern, medical science,
psychological insight, artistic integrity or true literary expression. It in-
tends the corruption of public morality by pandering to prurient interest.
A light covering of literary phrase, artistic style, medical terminology or
psychological theorizing cannot redeem what is patently an obscene
intention. As the law is written to preserve society from the corruptive
influence of indecency, so the Court must look to the evidence of intention
which the material before it reveals. Here the practical question is raised
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as to what degree of obscenity may be present in a publication or film. The
"dominant effect" of the work seems to be, with the exception of some
justices, the Court's norm of liability before the law. This norm apparently
is in use as a prevention against confining speech and publication to nar-
row areas of expression, while restricting the writer and publisher who fears
falling afoul of the law. I submit that the permission of any obscenity
becomes an opening wedge to the admission of unlimited obscenity. It
must, in the light of such permissiveness, be asked: When is the culpable
degree of obscenity reached? What norm should be employed in the deter-
mination of "dominant effect"? Since the Constitution has been consis-
tently interpreted as not including obscenity under free speech, it must
have been with the realization that the expression of all ideas can be
successful without drawing into use the worthless and degenerate.
In the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on obscenity, I find a
healthy trend in the Court's ruling and reasoning. It defines obscenity and
places it outside the protection of the law. Yet it seems to tolerate obscen-
ity, so long as a work, "taken as a whole," does not predominantly appeal
to the prurient interest of the average person in the locality nor violate
contemporary standards. It seems contradictory to me to assert that ob-
scenity is not under first amendment protection and simultaneously to
allow it, as long as the general character of the book is not obscene. Could
not some parts be obscene, while the general intention is wholesome? Is
this justified by some credence that the law is not concerned de minimis?
Is the "taken as a whole" test a return, in modified form, to the "utterly
without redeeming social value" as enunciated by a plurality in Memoirs?
It should be remembered that the Court specifically rejected this separate
test.
The Court, in my view, has wisely given over the determination of
obscenity to the state's "police powers," since no national norm of obscen-
ity could be realizable. The control of public morality has always been
understood to be part of the powers reserved by the Constitution to the
states. Simultaneously the Court, in consideration of the important protec-
tions of the first amendment, has required of the states a respect for certain
"basic guidelines." Some of these protections have appeared in the cases
that have been summarized in this article, under the decisions of June,
1973.
A last question concerns the individual who fears innocently falling
into the thickets of the law, and so is restrained in his freedom of speech,
composition, filmmaking or action. The presumption of innocence in the
writer, speaker, publisher or actor, who conspire to capture the obscenity
market, is a bit naive. But, even if innocent, their protections are many.
First, their motives are not subject to the scrutiny of the law, but only the
intention which is revealed in the production. Second, they have the guid-
ance of laws and court decisions which offer enlightenment to the innocent.
Third, the creation of advisory groups of citizens can help them in knowing
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the moral standards of the community. Fourth, the Court has been more
than tolerant in its reading of the evidences that border on and often
encompass the obscene.
It is my conviction that there is no present danger of writers and
publishers having their freedom restricted. Rather, in the widespread pes-
tilence of obscenity, where the law has become ineffective and the courts
permissive to a dangerous degree, it is the public that has been left unpro-
tected from the virulent and aggressive proliferation of obscenity in speech,
writings, films and action.
